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Abstract
The virulence of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) was explained in large part by
the increased reliance of the global financial system on market-based funding and the lack
of preexisting tools to address a disruption in that type of system. This paper surveys market
liquidity programs (MLPs), which we define as government interventions in which the key
motivation is to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale funding market that is under stress.
Most of the MLPs surveyed in this paper were launched during and after the GFC, but two
pre-GFC MLPs are included. A subsequent survey on MLPs in response to the COVID-19 crisis
is forthcoming. MLPs focus on markets that a central bank believes are critical to financial
stability. Stress in these markets could be interfering with monetary policy transmission or
disrupting the smooth flow of credit to the real economy. MLPs depart from traditional
central bank responses to a systemwide liquidity crisis. MLPs have used a variety of
techniques that central bankers would typically consider nonstandard for the purpose of
promoting liquidity in wholesale funding markets. These include (1) targeted lender-of-last
resort activities, (2) lending securities for securities, (3) lending cash for securities, (4) largescale asset purchases, (5) targeted asset purchases, and (6) indirect asset purchases.
Keywords: market liquidity, wholesale funding, market-based funding, financial stability
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Introductory note: In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, a colorcoded system is used to highlight particularly noteworthy design features. This
system is as follows:
Color

Meaning

BLUE – INTERESTING

A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider.
Typically, this determination is based on
the observation that the design feature
involves a unique way of addressing a
challenge common to this type of program.
Less commonly, there will be empirical
evidence or a widely held consensus that
the design feature was effective in this
context, in which case we describe that
evidence or consensus.

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically,
this determination is based on the
observation that the designers of the
feature later made significant changes to
the feature with the intention of improving
the functioning of the program. Less
commonly, there will be empirical evidence
or a widely held consensus that the design
feature was ineffective in this context, in
which case we describe that evidence or
consensus.
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I. Overview
This paper surveys market liquidity programs (MLPs), which we define as government
interventions for which the key motivation is to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale
funding market that is under stress. MLPs focus on markets that a central bank believes are
critical to financial stability. Stress in these markets could be interfering with monetary
policy transmission or disrupting the smooth flow of credit to the real economy. This paper
focuses mainly on MLPs used during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). A
subsequent survey of MLPs in response to the COVID-19 crisis is forthcoming in 2021.
MLPs depart from traditional central bank responses to a systemwide liquidity crisis. In
traditional interventions, central banks seek to fortify the balance sheets of financial
institutions so that those institutions can allocate liquidity where it is needed. In contrast, in
MLPs, the government has some idea where it would like the liquidity to be allocated. In
common with traditional interventions, MLPs may rely on individual institutions as
intermediaries or market-makers to pass on liquidity.
MLPs have used a variety of techniques that central bankers would typically consider
nonstandard for the purpose of promoting liquidity in wholesale funding markets. These
include (Table 1):
(1) Targeted lender-of-last resort (LOLR) activities: lending to financial institutions with the
expectation that they will use the funds to promote liquidity in a specific market;
(2) Lending securities for securities: lending securities to financial institutions, taking as
collateral assets from distressed markets;
(3) Lending cash for securities: lending cash to a new class of financial institutions, taking as
collateral assets from distressed markets;
(4) Large-scale asset purchases: buying assets outright in large quantities, to stimulate
trading in stressed markets;
(5) Targeted asset purchases: buying assets in limited amounts to promote price discovery;
and,
(6) Indirect asset purchases: lending funds to private market participants to enable them to
purchase assets.
This survey includes only two cases prior to the GFC. Both were targeted lender-of-last resort
activities. In 1970, in order to restore liquidity to the commercial paper (CP) market
following the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Transportation Company (Penn Central)
railroad, the Federal Reserve channeled funds to banks via the discount window and eased
restrictions on the interest rates banks could pay wholesale depositors. In 1987, following a
historic stock market decline, the Federal Reserve took a number of measures to maintain
liquidity in the payments and settlements system.6

Earlier examples of large-scale asset purchases include the purchases of equities by the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority in 1997 and the Bank of Japan in 2002; these may be covered in future YPFS cases.
6
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Table 1: List of Market Liquidity Programs by Type and Targeted Market
Market
Type of Program

Commercial Paper

Interbank

MBS/ABS

Targeted LOLR Activities

1970 CP Crisis
(US, 1970)

Loan Bill Scheme,
Excess-Capital
Temporary Credit
Facility
(Denmark, 2008)

Single-Tranche
Repo (US, 2008)

Lending Securities for
Securities
Lending Cash for Securities

Special FundsSupplying
Operations
(Japan, 2008)

Large-Scale Asset
Purchases

CPF, SCPF
(UK, 2009)

Targeted Asset Purchases

Outright Purchases
of CP
(Japan, 2008)

Indirect Asset Purchases

AMLF, CPFF,
MMIFF (US, 2008)

Three-Year LTRO
(EU, 2011)

Bonds

Stocks
Market Crash
(US, 1987)

TSLF (US, 2008);
SLS (UK, 2008)

TSLF (US, 2008);
SLS (UK, 2008)

PDCF (US, 2008)

PDCF (US, 2008)

CBPP
(EU, 2009&11)

APP (UK, 2009)
SMP (EU, 2010)
CBSMS (UK, 2009)

TALF (US, 2008);
PPIP (US, 2009)

Acronym note: AMLF– Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility; APP–UK Asset Purchase Program; CBPP–EU Covered Bond Purchase Program;
CBSMS–UK Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme; CPF–UK Commercial Paper Facility;
CPFF–Commercial Paper Funding Facility; MMIFF–Money Market Investor Funding Facility;
PDCF–Primary Dealer Credit Facility; PPIP–Public-Private Investment Program; SCPF–UK
Secured Commercial Paper Facility; SLS–UK Special Liquidity Scheme; SMP–EU Securities
Market Program; TALF–Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility; Three-Year LTRO–ECB
Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations; TSLF–Term Securities Lending Facility
Source: Author analysis.
The virulence of the GFC was explained in large part by the increased reliance of the global
financial system on market-based funding and the lack of preexisting tools to address a
disruption in that type of system.
Particularly in the US, funding for residential housing had largely moved off banks’ balance
sheets into the so-called shadow banking system. Many home mortgages were packaged into
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and some of these securities were sold to asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and/or repackaged into collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs); the securitization process itself was funded on a short-term basis through
warehouse loans, CP, and repurchase agreements (repos); and this funding was provided by
money market mutual funds (MMFs) and other institutional cash pools. Taken together, this
system took on all the functions of traditional banks: with long-term loans at one end funded
by short-term liabilities at the other. And this system was global: non-US banks, particularly
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European, were deeply involved in the US shadow banking system and relied on short-term
dollar-based wholesale markets to fund these activities. As of 2005, more than 40% of global
shadow banking assets were in the US and 30% were in the euro area (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Share of Assets from Nonbank Financial Intermediaries

Source: Estenssoro 2013.
The market-liquidity crisis focused initially in mid-2007 on the MBS market and its related
products and institutions: CDOs, ABCP, MMFs, and repos. The first attempt to address these
market disruptions was through the standard central bank toolbox of traditional monetary
policy and direct provision of liquidity to depository institutions. The European Central Bank
(ECB) injected $130 billion into banks, for example. While fear of stigma prevented US banks
from significantly using the Federal Reserve’s discount window, they drew more than $100
billion in advances in August 2007 alone on mortgage-related assets from the Federal Home
Loan Banks (FHLBs), quasi-lenders-of-last-resort available for some institutions in the US.
The Federal Reserve also eased restrictions to encourage banks to help their securities
affiliates fund mortgage-related assets. In late 2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the
Term Auction Facility (TAF) and currency-swap arrangements to increase the use of its
discount window by banks and to channel dollars to foreign banks affected by the growing
crisis.
By early 2008, the Federal Reserve had become concerned about how the brewing financial
crisis was affecting the primary dealers through which it conducts monetary policy. These
included the five large independent US investment banks as well as the US securities arms of
European and other foreign banks active in US securitization markets. These firms were
dependent on overnight funding of hundreds of billions of dollars in CP, repos, and securities
lending to conduct their business. If these wholesale funding markets froze, there was the
risk that one of these firms might fail and not only disturb a key monetary policy
transmission channel but also have additional significant negative impacts on the financial
system as a whole.
These concerns led the Federal Reserve to launch the first MLP of the crisis: targeted LOLR
activities (the Single-Tranche Repo) and innovative securities-for-securities and securitiesfor-cash swaps that built on preexisting tools but focused on restarting liquidity in specific
wholesale funding markets. As the disruption deepened, other central banks took similar
measures.
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was followed by a sudden and
prolonged liquidity freeze. The shadow banking system was experiencing a run, analogous
to a traditional bank run, that quickly threatened to block the flow of funds to the real
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economy. Among other measures, central banks across the world took the extraordinary
step of attempting to stimulate market trading by buying assets outright or (in the US)
lending to financial organizations to do so. It was hoped that MLPs could act as a temporary
bridge to promote the long-term stabilization of important wholesale funding markets.
In retrospect, MLPs have been described as representing a new role for central banks in
financial systems dominated by wholesale funding: that of a market-maker of last resort
(Tucker 2009). Whereas the traditional role of a central bank as LOLR is to stabilize the
balance sheet of banks, the role of a market-maker of last resort is to stabilize the limit-order
book in critical funding markets (Cecchetti and Disyatat 2010).
Table 2 below shows the peak usage of each MLP. Where the numbers were unavailable, we
included an aggregate amount of the program used throughout its life. Two US programs, the
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) and Public-Private Investment ProgramLegacy Loans (PPIP (Legacy Loans)), were unused, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF) and PPIP (Legacy Securities) were generally considered underused.
Similarly, Denmark’s central bank has noted the underuse of its two programs, the Loan Bill
Scheme and Excess-Capital Temporary Credit Facility. We note here, however, that
“underused” does not necessarily mean “ineffective,” because it is possible for just the
availability of programs to stabilize markets.
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Table 2: Program Usage
Program

Peak Usage
(in billions)

Program

Peak Usage
(in billions)

1970 CP Crisis

$1.7

CPF

£2.4

Single-Tranche Repo

$80

APP

NA***

TSLF

$236

SCPF

NA***

PDCF

$147

CBSMS

£1.6

AMLF

$152

22% of ABCP

Denmark Loan Bill Scheme

DKK 6*

20% of CP

Denmark Excess-Capital Temporary
Credit Facility

DKK 14*

% of Market **

CPFF

$350

MMIFF

0

CBPP1

€60*

TALF

$48

CBPP2

€16*

PPIP (Legacy Loans)

0

SMP

€218*

PPIP (Legacy Securities)

$24.9*

Three-Year LTRO

€1,000*

Japan Outright Purchases of CP

¥2,680*

Japan Special Funds-Supplying
Operations

¥38,000*

% of Market **
One-Third of
Sterling CP

*peak usage data unavailable
**outstanding at the time of peak
***general usage data unavailable
Acronym note: AMLF-The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility; APP-UK Asset Purchase Program; CBPP-ECB Covered Bond Purchase
Program; CBSMS-UK Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme; CPF-UK Commercial Paper
Facility; CPFF-Commercial Paper Funding Facility; MMIFF-Money Market Investor Funding
Facility; PDCF-Primary Dealer Credit Facility; PPIP-Public-Private Investment Program; SCPFUK Secured Commercial Paper Facility; SLS-UK Special Liquidity Scheme; SMP-ECB Securities
Market Program; TALF-Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility; TSLF-Term Securities
Lending Facility; Three-year LTRO-ECB Three-year Long Term Refinancing Operations
Source: Author analysis.
All acronyms used throughout our paper are defined in the paper and the Glossary.

II. General Themes for Key Design Features in MLPs
1. An overly restrictive program may create a stigma problem because financial
institutions will hesitate if they believe participation could signal weakness.
MLPs can work only if financial institutions participate. During a crisis, financial institutions
may be reluctant to draw on emergency lines of credit from the central bank if doing so could
signal weakness to others. This concern intensified in 2008 as investors began to doubt the
creditworthiness of major market participants. But the perception of weakness does not
need to be based on reality to keep eligible institutions from participating in emergency
lending programs (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014).
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One way central banks addressed stigma during the GFC was through auctions (for example,
the Federal Reserve’s Term Securities Lending Facility [TSLF] and the Bank of England’s
Asset Purchase Program [APP] and Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme [CBSMS]).
Auctions provided safety in numbers. Because many would borrow at once, there was less
risk the market could identify a major borrower. Because the price was determined by
auction, there was no direct connection to the stigma of paying a preset “penalty” rate. And
because auctions occurred regularly but no more than once per week, there was less of a
direct link to an immediate need for funding (English and Mosser 2018).
Second, limited or lagging disclosure can prevent stigma: if the market doesn’t know a bank
has received official liquidity, the bank won’t suffer from stigma (Winters 2012). For
example, in the crisis-era collateral swap programs (the Federal Reserve’s TSLF and the Bank
of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme [SLS]), there was no reported change in total assets
for the borrowing institutions or the central bank’s reserves.
Third, many MLPs offered uniform access for all financial institutions, irrespective of their
condition and systemic importance. Central banks sometimes encouraged healthy
institutions to participate, as the Bank of England did to limit stigma in the SLS (Winters
2012).
The stigma problem is mainly relevant for government programs that financial institutions
don’t use in normal times. The ECB was able to lend billions of euros in the early days of the
crisis through open market operations in part because its facility was already available to
hundreds of financial institutions and used regularly (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson
2014).
2. An overly generous program may create moral hazard.
Moral hazard is a perennial concern of central bankers. In the context of MLPs, the concern
is that providing emergency liquidity in a systemic crisis will encourage institutions to
neglect the task of building liquidity buffers once the crisis has passed (Cecchetti and
Disyatat 2010). Of course, there is an interaction between moral hazard and stigma: to the
extent market participants are worried about stigma, there is less reason to worry that they
will become complacent next time.
One way that central banks addressed moral hazard concerns during the GFC was by
charging fees. It is a balancing act: the fee needs to be high enough to minimize moral hazard,
cover the central bank’s costs, and potentially limit its risks, but not so high as to deter
participation (Plenderleith 2012). In the US, TSLF, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF),
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), and TALF imposed fees on participants. For
example, the PDCF imposed a frequency-based fee—additional fees were charged dealers
that accessed the facility on more than 45 business days. In some cases, as in the TSLF, fees
reflected the riskiness of certain collateral; in other cases, other measures were used to limit
the central bank’s credit risk, such as collateral or haircuts.
Before the GFC, central banks sought to limit moral hazard through “constructive ambiguity.”
In other words, uncertainty about whether and how a central bank would provide liquidity
was seen as a deterrent to private sector risk-taking. But at the depth of the crisis, the threat
of possible inaction was no longer seen as credible. In a post-crisis paper, a group of central
bankers noted: “Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether constructive ambiguity is
a viable policy option in the future” (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014).
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3. Legal constraints can affect the structure and timing of an MLP.
The Federal Reserve faced statutory limitations that other central banks didn’t face during
the GFC.
First, under a 1932 law, the Federal Reserve was allowed to lend to nonbanks through its
discount window only in “unusual and exigent” circumstances. However, it hadn’t used that
authority in 70 years and was reluctant to do so. Meanwhile, US financial markets relied
heavily on market-making by five large independent investment banks and many foreign
bank-owned securities firms that did not have discount window access at the Federal
Reserve. In contrast, most financial activities in Europe, the United Kingdom, and Japan were
conducted by “universal banks” that did have such access. Their central banks could make
do with traditional tools early in the crisis. As the crisis deepened, the Federal Reserve would
on many occasions make the required “unusual and exigent” determination to provide
liquidity to nonbanks and to support distressed funding markets. “In effect, the Federal
Reserve has had to innovate in large part to achieve what other central banks have been able
to effect through existing tools,” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said in May 2008
(Bernanke 2008).
Second, the Federal Reserve may lend to financial institutions, but it can’t purchase nongovernment assets. This difference in central bank powers was a key factor shaping the
design of MLPs, as shown below.
4. MLPs may interfere with monetary policy goals.
Central banks conduct monetary policy (that is, they set policy interest rates) through open
market operations that expand or contract their balance sheets. During the GFC, central
banks sought to prevent MLPs from interfering with monetary policy by sterilizing the
impact on the central banks’ balance sheets—in other words, by preventing the programs
from expanding the money supply (Borio and Disyatat 2009).
They could sterilize the impact of MLPs by lending securities rather than cash, selling
Treasury debt to finance the activity, and paying interest on reserves. Similarly, Federal
Home Loan Bank advances to US banks to finance mortgage assets during the second half of
2007 had no impact on the money supply, as the FHLBs finance their activities through the
sale of debt to private investors. This activity could be compared to a central bank’s standing
facility, although the automatic sterilization through independent financing makes it
unusual.
During the GFC, central banks could arrest the sterilization activity when monetary policy
goals turned increasingly expansionary. For example, the Bank of England sterilized its
purchase of CP only briefly before it launched its first quantitative easing program; after that,
it funded the purchase of CP through central bank reserves, supporting the goals of
quantitative easing.
5. MLPs may introduce new credit and counterparty risks that have to be managed.
MLPs introduce potential risks because the government is injecting liquidity into a market it
may not traditionally deal with. Mechanisms to limit the government’s credit exposure
include measures to ensure accurate pricing of risks, collateral requirements, or facility fees
and interest incomes charged. Central banks may hire temporary staff or recruit third-party
firms to assist in risk assessment.
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Also, traditional programs were typically on a recourse basis, meaning the central bank’s
counterparties were on the hook if collateral was insufficient. However, in cases where a
central bank decided for policy reasons to lift the recourse requirement (for example, the
Federal Reserve’s Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility [AMLF] and TALF programs), private investors were sometimes brought in to share
the risk of loss, while also sharing in potential upside.
As MLPs cannot be entirely risk-free, a central bank may consider the amount of residual
credit risk it is comfortable accepting. The Treasury may get involved as a backstop. For
example, the US Treasury shared risks with the Federal Reserve in the PPIP. The Bank of
England conducted its MLPs with an indemnity from the government (Tucker 2009).
The progression of programs during the GFC illustrated a growing willingness by the Federal
Reserve and other central banks to take more risks. In the TSLF and PDCF, two early
programs, the Federal Reserve sought to vary the composition of its balance sheet and keep
the overall size largely unchanged. However, as the crisis intensified following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve entered a second phase that involved a rapid
expansion of its balance sheet. The Federal Reserve increased its risk tolerance in two ways:
in the collateral it accepted and in the counterparties it was willing to deal with directly. In
particular, the Federal Reserve had to consider whether and when to lend to nonbanks.

III. Specific Key Design Decisions in MLPs
Purpose of MLPs
MLPs have a key motivation to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale funding market that
is under stress. The wholesale funding markets include CP, repos, asset-backed securities
(ABS), MBS, certain bond markets, and (under some conditions) stock markets. MLPs have
used a variety of techniques that central bankers would typically consider nonstandard and
often relied on individual institutions as intermediaries or market-makers to pass on
liquidity. MLPs can promote price discovery in frozen markets, provide temporary funding
to tide markets over until buyers regain confidence, and head off cascading asset fire sales
and liquidity runs.
Legal Authority
Differences in legal authority can affect the methods through which central banks reach
illiquid markets. At the time of the GFC, the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England faced
few constraints limiting their MLPs. They lent to a broad range of private actors and made
outright purchases on the open market.7
In contrast, the Federal Reserve is not allowed to extend loans to nonbanks in normal times,
and its power to purchase market instruments is limited. Therefore, for many MLPs during
the GFC, the Federal Reserve relied on its emergency lending power to lend to nonbanks, in

After the crisis, the Financial Services Act 2012 clarified the Bank of England’s responsibility for crisis
management but required the Bank to seek cooperation from Her Majesty’s Treasury if a liquidity program
could put public funds at risk.
7

50

Market Liquidity Programs: GFC and Before

Rhee et al.

some cases enabling those organizations to purchase assets on the open market. 8 For
example, in the AMLF, the Federal Reserve lent cash to primary dealers so that they could
purchase ABCP from MMFs, and in the CPFF, it lent cash to primary dealers to purchase CP
directly.
These legal limitations may have affected the Federal Reserve’s ability to reach illiquid
markets quickly. In part because the Federal Reserve’s indirect asset purchase programs
were more complex than the direct asset-purchase programs implemented by other central
banks, in some cases (for example, the MMIFF, TALF, PPIP), they took more than one month
to get off the ground. Certainly, response time is an element of effectiveness. Ultimately,
however, the methods themselves do not seem to not have had much influence on the
effectiveness of each MLP.
Auction or Standing Facility
As discussed above, central banks sometimes dealt with stigma by using auctions instead of
standing facilities. TAF first succeeded in utilizing the auction format (Armantier and Sporn
2013). TSLF was an extension of the System Open Market Account Securities Lending
Program, and thus it seemed natural to be in the auction format. Other Federal Reserve and
Bank of England programs, such as PPIP, APP, and CBSMS, were also conducted as auctions
(Cecchetti and Disyatat 2010). Still, some MLPs were run as standing facilities and used other
features to deal with stigma.
Program Size
Sometimes, the size of the program was large or even unlimited relative to the size of the
market where liquidity was under pressure. Several specified no size limits, including the
Bank of Japan’s Special Funds-Supplying Operations, the ECB’s Three-Year Long-Term
Refinancing Operations (Three-Year LTRO), and the Bank of England’s Commercial Paper
Facility (CPF) and Secured Commercial Paper Facility (SCPF). The Bank of England stated
that the lack of limits was meant to ensure that the program would remain active as long as
necessary until normal market conditions returned.
Targeted programs could be smaller and still achieve their purpose. For example, two
programs—the Bank of Japan’s Outright Purchases of CP and the Bank of England’s CBSMS—
sought to support price discovery by making sure that transactions took place. The
frequency of the purchases was more important than the size. The Bank of England noted in
a market notice that CBSMS was intended “to provide a back-stop offer to purchase modest
amounts of a wide range of investment-grade sterling UK corporate bonds …, initially by
facilitating market-making by banks and dealers.” (Bank of England 2009)
Program Duration
Programs sometimes had specified end dates, but those were often extended. In extending
the durations of programs, central banks typically noted that market conditions had yet to
normalize or that other conditions still existed that continued to destabilize the market.
Denmark extended its Loan Bill Scheme to align its expiry date with those of other temporary
credit facilities.

After postcrisis reforms, the Federal Reserve retains the ability to conduct market-wide liquidity programs,
but it now must obtain the Treasury secretary’s approval before establishing such a program and is required
to report to Congress on usage.
8
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On the other hand, the Bank of England launched the CPF and SCPF with unspecified end
dates. The Bank designed the facilities to last as long as abnormal conditions in corporate
credit markets continued to impair the financing of real economic activity.
Prelaunch Public Consultation
The private sector was sometimes consulted on the details of a program in advance.
The Bank of England, before launching CPF and CBSMS, invited detailed comments on
various components of the programs from all interested parties, including eligible
institutions, intermediaries, and infrastructure providers. Before launching SCPF, it
published a consultative paper on the proposal, which was an extension to its Asset Purchase
Facility (APF). Determining the appropriate extent of such consultation is a delicate
balancing act: too little consultation carries the risk that a program will not meet any actual
market needs; too much consultation can allow front-running, market manipulation, and
other subverting of social goals for private ones.
Private Sector Involvement
Participation of private institutions ensured accuracy and effectiveness of certain MLPs and
resulted in interesting structures of those MLPs.
The Federal Reserve’s MLPs made extensive use of private partners. For example, the TALF
program used agents—primary dealers or other designated agents that handled certain
administrative activities between the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and
borrowers. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, the program custodian, was responsible
for holding collateral, collecting and distributing payments and administrative fees, verifying
the data provided by the TALF agents, and validating the pricing and ratings submitted for
pledged securities. Collateral monitors, selected by the FRBNY, provided data and modeling
services used in risk assessments and validated collateral pricing and ratings.
PPIP set up funds that were managed with full autonomy by prescreened private sector fund
managers, which would buy legacy securities put up for sale by participating financial
institutions.
For the MMIFF program, industry representatives were involved in several decisions made
in the program design, including: (1) choosing JPMorgan Chase & Company to be the sponsor
of the conduit special purpose vehicles (SPVs), (2) deciding to establish five SPVs, and (3)
choosing the 50 institutional issuers whose debt would be eligible for purchase. The issuers
were chosen primarily because they were among the largest issuers of highly rated shortterm liabilities held by MMFs. The Federal Reserve also sought to achieve geographical
diversification in each SPV.
Loss- and Profit-Sharing Arrangements
Some US facilities implemented a loss- and profit-sharing arrangement with the private
investors participating in the program. For example, in TALF, private investors shared
returns on the purchased ABCP pro rata with the Federal Reserve. In view of the long termto-maturity of the loans, and wide variety of spreads for newly issued ABS and credit quality
across the ABS market, it was desirable to have private investors’ scrutiny. This involvement
also avoided undercutting market mechanisms for allocating credit to borrowers by relying
on private structuring and pricing of new securitizations (Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar 2012).
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Moreover, relying on private investors in newly issued ABS and commercial mortgagebacked securities (CMBS) also provided benchmark pricing to the market. Even a small
number of transactions informed market participants about where securitization liabilities
would tend to price. This reduced market and funding liquidity risk by diminishing
uncertainty about the funding cost of the underlying loans and the feasibility of a
securitization exit, easing a key constraint on willingness to lend to creditworthy borrowers.
Additionally, with a first-loss position, investors had skin in the game, incentivizing them to
screen collateral for credit quality (Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar 2012).
A similar arrangement was available in AMLF.
In MMIFF, issuers selling assets to an SPV shared the risk of those assets. When issuers sold
assets to the SPV, they received 90% of the purchase price in cash and the rest in ABCP issued
by the SPV. And since the ABCP was subordinated to the FRBNY’s recourse loan, the issuers
were the first to absorb losses to the SPV. In addition, the yield on ABCP was at least 25 basis
points less than the yield on the eligible asset sold, providing additional spread to the SPV.
These complexities in the loss-sharing arrangement, however, may have contributed to delay
in operation of the program and lack of usage.
In the PPIP Legacy Securities program, fund managers (private investors) were required to
invest at least $20 million of their firms’ funds in their own Public-Private Investment Funds.
This was done to ensure that they had “skin in the game” (SIGTARP 2009). These fund
managers were also prepared to forfeit this equity should their investment decisions yield
results that wiped it out (US Treasury 2009).
Further loss-sharing was also achieved through haircuts discussed below (SIGTARP 2009).
Loan or Purchase
Liquidity was provided to a troubled funding market either through loans and purchases,
including indirect purchases, of assets. Central banks either participated directly in the
market or indirectly supplied liquidity to the key market participants against a pledge of
collateral (WGLA 2017).
The US Single-Tranche Repo, TSLF, and PDCF; the two Denmark facilities; the ECB’s ThreeYear LTRO; and Japan’s Special Funds-Supplying Operations were all conducted as loans.
Most of these were extensions of existing discount window or open market operations, so it
was natural that they took the form of loans.
Other US facilities took the form of loans to purchase eligible assets due to the Federal
Reserve’s limited authority to directly purchase assets. For example, TALF provided term
credit against newly issued ABS rather than outright purchases. This created an incentive for
participants to establish sound collateral for the securities, since they took the first risk of
loss (Cecchetti and Disyatat 2010).
Under AMLF, the Federal Reserve loaned funds to an intermediary such as a depository
institution or a broker-dealer so that entity could purchase eligible ABCP from eligible MMFs.
PPIP also did not initiate outright government asset purchases but made nonrecourse loans.
In contrast, the Bank of England, ECB, and Bank of Japan either did not have any legal
restrictions on their direct participation in the funding markets and, in some cases, were
explicitly authorized to make outright purchases of market products and had a history of
doing so. Therefore, they were able to directly purchase key financial products from the
market.
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Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson (2014) observe that the different ways to promote liquidity
seem to have been influenced by the legal authority and framework of each central bank.
They also observe that there does not appear to be any reason apart from legal restrictions
why the extension of credit was in the form of a loan. The loan versus purchase decision does
not seem to have made a noticeable difference on the effectiveness of MLPs. Moreover, from
the perspective of risk, the loans were virtually the same as if the Federal Reserve had bought
the paper directly (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014).
Eligible Institutions
Some MLPs were limited to institutions the government was already familiar with. This was
especially true for US MLPs during the GFC. As the Federal Reserve was less experienced
with the markets, participating private institutions’ expertise assisted the Federal Reserve
to launch more effective and efficient MLPs. Moreover, allowing the private investors to
share the returns and loss from the program incentivized the investors to be diligent in their
investments.
The TSLF, PDCF, and CPFF utilized primary dealers to reach the markets. Primary dealers
had established relationships with the FRBNY and were active in the markets so were well
suited to intermediate between the target markets and the Federal Reserve. In the AMLF, to
facilitate quick implementation of the program, the Federal Reserve relied on institutions
with which it had existing relationships (depository institutions and broker-dealers) to act
as intermediaries and be the actual borrowers under the program.
Haircuts
The loan amount or the purchase price in MLPs generally incorporated a haircut on the value
of underlying collateral or purchased assets. Haircuts helped mitigate the risks the central
bank was taking on illiquid assets. Haircuts also helped address moral-hazard concerns: they
were seen as important to encourage private-sector actors to monitor their own risks.
Unlike most of the Federal Reserve’s financial crisis programs, the AMLF program applied
no haircuts to purchased ABCP. The Federal Reserve required AMLF participants to purchase
ABCP from MMFs at the MMF’s amortized cost. This was done to prevent ABCP from
transacting at depressed values. The Federal Reserve feared further market instability if
another fund had to “break the buck”. Without a haircut, to minimize the risk that it
undertook, the Federal Reserve limited collateral to high-quality ABCP and tightened the
requirements as the program progressed.
CPFF also did not impose any haircuts. The Federal Reserve instead lent against highly rated
CP at a rate lower than the market rate at the time but higher than the rate at normal times.
Further detail on interest rates for CPFF is discussed below.
Loans
Recourse or Nonrecourse
Loans were either recourse or nonrecourse, and nonrecourse loans generally were
accompanied by a private loss-sharing arrangement. The advantage of recourse loans is that
repayment is backed by the financial resources of the borrower. Recourse loans are typically
further backed by collateral, which offers a secondary source of repayment (Domanski,
Moessner, and Nelson 2014).
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The Federal Reserve’s earlier two MLPs—the TSLF and PDCF—were designed as recourse
loans. Subsequent Federal Reserve programs—the AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF, TALF, and PPIP—
used nonrecourse loans. Various programs in the United Kingdom, euro area, Denmark, and
Japan also used nonrecourse. The Federal Reserve chose nonrecourse loans in some cases
because it was lending to new counterparties whose financial condition could not be readily
assessed. In other cases, the Federal Reserve found it would be counterproductive to expose
counterparties to the risk of a decline in the collateral’s value. In this case, from the Federal
Reserve’s point of view, providing a nonrecourse loan was economically the same as
purchasing the underlying collateral (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014).
In some cases, the Federal Reserve used private loss-sharing arrangements to mitigate the
risk it took in collateralized nonrecourse loans. For example, in the AMLF, TALF, and PPIP,
borrowers and investors shared returns and losses on the collateral purchased with the
borrowed funds and posted as collateral with the Federal Reserve. In the MMIFF, the FRBNY
funded 90% of the cost of collateral through loans; eligible money market investors funded
the rest by purchasing subordinated ABCP issued by SPVs.
The Federal Reserve didn’t implement any private loss-sharing arrangement in the CPFF.
Under that program, the FRBNY lent cash to a new private company, the CPFF LLC, that
would then purchase CP. As noted, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act allows the
Federal Reserve to lend to nonbanks in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” The Federal
Reserve also must determine that such loans have been “secured to [its] satisfaction.” The
Federal Reserve’s legal advisors made that determination, noting several risk mitigants,
including: (1) it would purchase only highly rated CP; (2) the loans to the LLC would be
secured by the purchased CP, plus any accumulated fees and earnings; and (3) the purchases
were at a discount to face value.
Terms
The terms of loans under certain MLPs matched the terms of underlying collateral. AMLF
and CPFF provided loans that mirrored the maturity and term of ABCP or CP collateral that
was purchased with and secured the loans. On the other hand, MMIFF provided overnight
loans, although the FRBNY was committed to continuing to fund the purchased collateral
assets until their maturity.
For TALF, the term of loans provided under the program was originally one year. However,
it was extended to three to five years as an industry group pointed out that there was at least
two years of mismatch between the terms of TALF loans and the underlying assets backing
the loans. The mismatch meant that the nonrecourse financing would expire before the
underlying debt securities were paid back, leaving the investors to assume the full risk for
the last two years of the investment. For that reason, the Federal Reserve extended the terms
of TALF loans.
Interest Rates
Liquidity facilities, in general, were designed so that accessing them would be optimal for
some institutions when markets were dysfunctional but would become suboptimal when
normal functioning of the markets returned (Cecchetti and Disyatat 2010). This balancing
act was critical in setting the interest rate of an MLP loan. For example, the CPFF program
charged a fixed spread over the three-month market rate, which was expected to become
unattractive in normal times.
Additionally, interest rates in MLPs were a security feature: the accumulation of interest was
expected to absorb losses and provide additional protection for central banks (GAO 2011).
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In launching Outright Purchases of CP, Bank of Japan Governor Masaaki Shirakawa stated
that the bid rate would be “more favorable than the market interest rates when the market
is malfunctioning”; since losses on any purchased CP come at a cost to the taxpayers, a
penalty rate would ensure that taxpayers were compensated for taking on the credit risk
(Shirakawa 2009).
High rates also ensured that MLPs were functional only during stress times. For example, for
the Bank of England’s CPF, the Asset Purchase Facility offered to buy up to three-month CP
at spreads that were significantly below market rates at the time but that were significantly
above those expected to prevail in normal conditions. Initially, this would help to drive
market spreads down and provide a backstop. This was set up to be self-liquidating as
normal market conditions returned (Fisher 2010).
Fees
As with interest rates, setting fees is a balancing act. For a program to be effective and ensure
widespread use, the fee should be high enough to minimize moral hazard but not too high as
to deter participation. The fees also should be sufficient to cover central banks’ costs of
managing each MLP (Plenderleith 2012).
In the US, TSLF, PDCF, CPFF, and TALF imposed fees on participating institutions. For
example, PDCF imposed a frequency-based fee: additional fees were charged dealers who
accessed the facility on more than 45 business days.
Fees also may reflect the riskiness of the collateral. In TSLF auctions, the Federal Reserve
charged a minimum fee of 10 basis points for Schedule 1 collateral (Treasuries and other
relatively safe assets traditionally accepted in open market operations) and 25 basis points
for Schedule 2 collateral (which encompassed riskier collateral, ultimately any investmentgrade security). CPFF charged an additional credit enhancement fee for unsecured CP. TALF
charged a higher administrative fee for loans secured by CMBS (20 basis points) compared
to nonmortgage asset-backed securities (10 basis points). However, Plenderleith’s report on
the Bank of England’s emergency liquidity assistance states that fees were not designed to
manage the risks to the central bank or to the public—those risks should have been
adequately covered by collateral and haircuts (Plenderleith 2012).
Eligible Collateral or Assets
Eligible collateral or assets were defined depending on the problems in the target market an
MLP was attempting to address and often included unconventional assets that the central
bank would not take in normal times. As the AMLF program was intended to assist MMFs in
the CP market, the ABCP it accepted for collateral had to be purchased from an MMF, among
other restrictions. TALF aimed to renew issuance of consumer and small-business ABS and
thus included only newly issued non-mortgage-backed ABS, newly issued CMBS, and legacy
CMBS.
In Denmark, to facilitate the interbank lending market, the central bank launched two
facilities: the Loan Bill Scheme and the Excess-Capital Temporary Credit Facility. The loan
bill program allowed the Danmarks Nationalbank to lend to a banking institution in
exchange for loan bills issued by another banking institution. A 2009 report from Danmarks
Nationalbank stated its disappointment in the efficacy of the loan bill program in supporting
the interbank lending market. The report noted that the program underestimated the degree
of loss of confidence among financial institutions and assumed that the banking institutions
wanted to lend to each other (Danmarks Nationalbank 2009). Hence, the central bank
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introduced the excess-capital facility, extending unsecured credit lines to banks on the basis
of the institutions’ excess capital adequacy. This facility was also underutilized.
Criteria for eligible collateral evolved with changes in the need of the market as troubles
deepened. The Federal Reserve expanded eligible collateral as market conditions worsened
after Lehman Brothers failed. TSLF broadened the eligible set of collateral to all investmentgrade debt securities, and PDCF included assets to closely match the types of instruments
that could be pledged in the triparty repurchase agreement systems of the two major
clearing banks. In the ECB, the first round of Securities Market Program (SMP) included
government bonds from the secondary markets of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, but the
second round was expanded to Italy and Spain, responding to problems in those markets.
Safeguards against collateral risks also determined the eligibility of an asset. In most
programs, assets had to satisfy certain credit-rating requirements. Also, programs often
explicitly excluded certain assets. The ECB’s Three-Year LTRO and the UK’s SCPF excluded
syndicated loans; Japan’s Special Funds-Supplying Operations excluded CP issued by real
estate investment corporations; and most UK programs excluded ABCP.
Other external limitations shaped the criteria for eligible collateral for MMIFF. Eligible
participants for MMIFF were limited to 2a-7 funds.9 Because 2a-7 funds could only purchase
and hold highly rated debt instruments, the Federal Reserve and FRBNY designed MMIFF
terms and conditions to help ensure that the subordinated notes issued by each SPV would
receive the highest rating from two or more major rating agencies (GAO 2011).
The Federal Reserve designed the eligible collateral structure for the Single-Tranche Repo
program to alleviate strains in agency MBS by removing the stigma associated with MBS at
the time. For conventional repo operations, the Federal Reserve accepts propositions from
dealers in three collateral tranches. In the first tranche, dealers may pledge only Treasury
securities. In the second tranche, dealers can also pledge federal agency debt. In the third
tranche, they can also pledge MBS issued or fully guaranteed by federal agencies. With the
Single-Tranche Repo program, dealers could combine MBS, federal agency debt, or Treasury
securities in the single tranche. This feature would appear to be a fix for a stigma problem
that carries no additional moral hazard risk: an unusual example of a free lunch in this policy
space.
Downgrade of Collateral
Some MLPs included features to protect the central bank if a rating agency downgraded the
collateral.
For example, under MMIFF, collateral downgrades would prevent the SPV from providing
any further loans to the issuer of that collateral until all assets issued by that issuer and held
by the SPV had matured. If there was a default, the SPV would not only stop providing further
loans to the issuer but would also cease repayment on outstanding ABCP from the issuer. In
TALF, if there was a collateral downgrade, TALF loans were not affected, but the downgraded
collateral could no longer be used to back any new TALF loans.

Money market funds are a type of mutual fund registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the Act. Money market funds pay dividends that reflect prevailing short-term
interest rates, are redeemable on demand, and, unlike other investment companies, seek to maintain a stable
net asset value, typically $1.00.
9
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In CPF, if purchased CP was downgraded below the minimum credit ratings set out by the
Bank of England, the issuer of that CP would be unable to access the facility again until it
again met the required minimum credit ratings.
SPV Involvement
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England established special purpose vehicles separate
from the central bank’s balance sheet for some MLPs.
The Federal Reserve created SPVs to purchase specific instruments and lent money to them
using its emergency authority. The SPVs in turn purchased assets from the troubled
institutions. These assets served as collateral for the Federal Reserve’s loans to the SPVs.
The CPFF established CPFF LLC to directly purchase newly issued ABCP and unsecured CP
with the loans it received from FRBNY for that purpose. The FRBNY’s loans were secured by
CPFF LLC’s assets including the CP that it purchased, fees that it collected and any uninvested
fees, earnings, and proceeds from investments. This structure was chosen because the
Federal Reserve would be dealing in a security that it did not normally handle and, with many
types of entities, that it did not normally lend to. Similarly, for the operation of TALF, FRBNY
created an SPV, TALF LLC, to manage any collateral surrendered by TALF borrowers to
FRBNY.
The MMIFF similarly was created with SPVs. However, unlike other Federal Reserve
programs with SPVs, these were set up to be managed by the private sector in collaboration
with FRBNY. FRBNY worked with JPMorgan to set up the MMIFF SPVs. The deployment of
multiple SPVs was intended, in part, to better ensure that MMIFF could continue to provide
funding in the event that one of its SPVs was required to cease purchases. It was also thought
that privately sponsored SPVs would appeal to the MMFs (GAO 2011).
Utilizing an SPV generally required additional structuring and administrative work.
Therefore, the MMIFF needed a full month to become operational after it was announced. By
comparison, the AMLF was announced on a Friday and was operating the next Monday. In
the AMLF, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston made loans to depository institutions to
purchase certain ABCP from MMFs. It could be set up more quickly because it used existing
discount window processes and documentation for its infrastructure.
The Bank of England also used an SPV for the CPF program but not due to any limits in its
legal authority. CPF was launched under the APF, which was a £50 billion facility to purchase
high-quality financial assets and ultimately to improve liquidity in credit markets. All
transactions under APF were undertaken by a subsidiary company of the Bank of England,
the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited, that borrowed from the central
bank to pay for its purchases.
Reserves Impact
In the US, UK, and ECB, central banks often prevented MLPs from interfering with the
exercise of monetary policy by actively sterilizing their impact the money supply. In SMP, the
ECB conducted special operations to reabsorb the liquidity injected through the SMP. The
following four methods were used to sterilize the impact of MLPs on reserves during the GFC.
The first was lending high-quality securities, typically Treasuries, to private financial
institutions in return for distressed securities (e.g., the Bank of England’s SLS and the Federal
Reserve’s TSLF). The second was issuing Treasury debt to finance the MLP activity (e.g., the
Bank of England’s early implementation of its Asset Purchase Facility and the Federal
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Reserve’s currency swap program in 200810). The third was selling a comparable amount of
Treasuries from the central bank’s portfolio to offset the MLP’s injection of dollars into the
market (e.g., PDCF). The fourth was paying interest on reserves, so the central bank was able
to offset expansionary effects of MLPs by paying banks to increase their reserves with the
central bank (e.g., the Federal Reserve beginning in October 2008).
In the wake of Lehman’s failure, central banks became less concerned about sterilizing MLPs,
partly because these programs could complement their increasingly expansionary monetary
policy stances. In the US, the startup of the CPFF and other MLPs led to a sharp growth in the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet beginning in late September 2008 (Dudley 2009). The Bank
of England briefly sterilized its purchases of CP before subsuming the program in the much
larger asset purchase under its quantitative easing program.
Disclosure
Central banks did not disclose the lists of institutions participating in the MLPs but often
disclosed aggregate transaction information with a lag.
To mitigate stigma, the Federal Reserve, like the Bank of England, had historically not
released the names of borrowers from the window. The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 now requires the Federal Reserve to disclose details of
discount window loans with a two‐year lag; this is thought to be sufficient to limit the stigma
associated with the use of the discount window.
More concerning, however, is the new reporting requirement to the US Congress for any
future use of the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act. Within seven days of establishment of any 13(3) program, the Board
must now report detailed transaction-level information to Congress on any lending activity
conducted under those programs.
Aggregated transaction data were often disclosed weekly in the United States. Certain
disclosures had the intention of improving information availability and supporting effective
market functioning. For example, in the PPIP, after each legacy CMBS subscription, the
FRBNY published the list of submitted legacy CMBS that had been accepted as collateral or
rejected, either on the basis of the explicit terms and conditions for legacy CMBS or the
FRBNY’s risk assessment.
In addition, the UK’s CBSMS regularly posted traded prices on its wire service and its website.
CPF and SCPF published the weekly aggregate amount of CP and securities purchased. The
Bank of England explained that such transparency was intended to reduce uncertainty in the
market value of corporate bonds and to reduce the risk aversion that contributed to market
illiquidity.
Relief from Regulatory Capital and Liquidity Requirements
In some cases, governments tweaked capital or liquidity requirements to encourage
institutions to use MLPs.
In the AMLF program, because the Federal Reserve protected borrowers from credit or
market risk in holding ABCP, the Federal Reserve assessed no regulatory capital charge with
respect to those holdings. The CP received a 0% risk weight for calculating risk-based capital
10

The currency swap programs will be covered in a future survey.
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and was excluded from average total consolidated assets for calculating regulatory leverage
ratios. On the other hand, the regulatory capital requirements for securities financed by a
TALF loan were the same as those for securities that were not financed by a TALF loan. We
were unable to identify a clear reason behind these different treatments.
With regard to liquidity requirements, in the Danish Loan Bill Scheme and Excess-Capital
Temporary Credit Facility, the buying institution could count the loan bill and credit lines
toward its statutory liquidity until one month before the expiry of each respective facility.
Relief from Other Restrictions
To improve the ability of an MLP to reach the intended markets, central banks at times
exempted or limited existing legal restrictions.
After the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, the Federal Reserve was concerned that the
discount-window adjustment alone would provide insufficient incentive to banks to support
the CP market. For that reason, the Federal Reserve suspended its interest-rate ceilings
under Regulation Q. This allowed banks to pay more for large-denomination certificates of
deposit and other time deposits.
In launching the AMLF program, the Federal Reserve exempted participating banks from
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. Section 23A limits a bank’s “covered transactions”
with any single affiliate of the bank to 10% of the bank’s equity, and all such transactions to
20%. The exemption facilitated banks’ purchase of ABCP from affiliated MMFs.
In announcing the TALF program, the government made it clear that the executive
compensation restrictions that Congress had mandated for companies receiving taxpayer
support under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) would not be applied to TALF
sponsors, underwriters, and borrowers. This was to encourage participation in the program.
In comparison, in the PPIP, it was not made clear whether PPIP participants would be exempt
from the executive compensation restrictions.
International Cooperation
The GFC showed how a crisis in one country can easily spill over to another. Global financial
institutions had increasingly invested and funded themselves in multiple currencies and
national financial markets. International coordination was necessary to address liquidity
strains that crossed international boundaries. Central banks found they needed to develop
new ways to coordinate their liquidity assistance programs. Furthermore, responding to the
crisis demanded an understanding of the differences in national legal and institutional
frameworks (WGLA 2017).
Foreign, mostly European banks played a significant role in US shadow-banking markets
prior to the crisis—borrowing short-term in US money markets and then investing in longterm US securitized assets. One estimate is that foreign banks sponsored about 60% of the
$1.2 trillion US ABCP market (Acharya, Afonso, and Kovner 2013); they had also issued half
a trillion dollars in dollar-based unsecured financial CP (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni
2011). When commercial-paper markets froze in mid-2007, European banks faced a severe
dollar shortage. The Federal Reserve coordinated with the European, Swiss, and other
central banks to establish currency swap lines through which the Federal Reserve could
provide dollars to central banks, which could then lend to their banks on dollar-based
collateral.
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US affiliates of foreign banks were also among the biggest direct users of US market liquidity
programs throughout 2008. For example, they accounted for more than half of the usage of
the TSLF and about three-quarters of the usage of the Single-Tranche Repo and the CPFF.

IV.

Evaluation

Post-crisis evaluations of market liquidity programs, typically conducted by central bank
staff, have measured success in various ways:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Was the program used sufficiently?
Was the program introduced expeditiously?
Was price discovery restored?
Did market volumes recover relatively quickly?
Was credit restored to the real economy?

To be sure, all of these criteria are not appropriate for all market liquidity programs. For
example, total usage is not a fair measure of the success of the 1970 and 1987 targeted LOLR
activities or of the crisis-era targeted asset-purchase programs, which sought to simply
establish market prices. And the recovery of market volumes is not necessarily a fair
measure of the success of a program like the AMLF, which successfully financed banks’
purchases of CP but could not address the market’s preference for overnight paper during
the crisis; policymakers then introduced the CPFF to temporarily create a market for longerterm paper until market conditions recovered.
Moreover, post-crisis studies emphasize the difficulty in isolating the independent effects of
MLPs. Market liquidity programs are often part of larger policy packages and, as their
launches typically coincide with the worst of a crisis, the aftermath may coincide with a
broader recovery. For example, studies suggest that it is hard to determine the role of PDCF
in alleviating liquidity constraints for primary dealers as the Federal Reserve had TSLF
running at the same time. In the UK, since the MLPs were launched under the larger Asset
Purchase Facility, it is again difficult to isolate their individual effectiveness. In Europe, the
ECB’s MLPs were among many operating programs to solve the same problem at the same
time.
For these reasons, some studies analyze the short-term effects that the announcements of
these programs may have had on market pricing to gauge how they were received by market
participants.
Usage
Usage is described above. Some programs were underutilized. In Denmark, massive
underuse of the Loan Bill Scheme was a disappointment to the central bank. In implementing
the Excess-Capital Temporary Credit Facility, it said that the facility was partly driven by the
initial failure of the loan bills program to meet banking needs that were intensified after the
fall of Lehman Brothers. It further elaborated that the scheme assumed that the banking
institutions wanted to lend to each other while the confidence among the banking
institutions continued to deteriorate. (Danmarks Nationalbank 2009)
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Speed of Rollout
The ability to roll out a program quickly provided benefits in some cases, serving as a bridge
as other programs were put together. The Federal Reserve’s AMLF and the Treasury’s money
market fund guarantee were both announced on September 19, 2008. But the AMLF was
rolled out the next business day because it used existing arrangements through the discount
window. The following week, as some MMFs continued to experience significant
redemptions, AMLF usage jumped to more than $150 billion before the Treasury guarantee
went into effect on September 29. Federal Reserve economists conclude that the program
had “provided substantial liquidity to MMFs at a critical moment” (Logan, Nelson, and
Parkinson 2018). Similarly, banks that borrowed from CPFF when it was launched on
October 27—as much as $15 billion by Bank of America Corporation alone—soon replaced
those borrowings with longer-term debt, once the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which guaranteed newly issued debt at far longer
maturities, was underway (Anderson and Gascon 2009).
On the other hand, a larger gap, one month or more, between the time when the program
was first announced and when the program actually became operational may have affected
the effectiveness of the program. Three examples of such programs are MMIFF, TALF, and
PPIP (Legacy Securities). These delays were generally due to the operational novelty and
complex structure of these programs.
Federal Reserve economists involved in constructing some of the Federal Reserve’s market
liquidity programs—including lending programs like TSLF and PDCF and the later indirect
asset purchase programs—have said that, in hindsight, earlier rollout might would have
made them more effective. “In retrospect … we think that earlier introduction of broader
programs and in some cases, in larger initial size could have been more effective. The
programs were not approved and implemented until it was abundantly clear that runs were
seriously impairing the ability of the financial institutions affected to meet the credit needs
of the economy” (Logan, Nelson, and Parkinson 2018).
Impact on Market Volumes
Market liquidity programs ultimately must be judged on their success at catalyzing private
sector transactions in targeted markets (Cecchetti and Disyatat 2010). The design of MLPs
entails a delicate balancing act: central banks seek to intervene forcefully enough to reengage
long-term market participants but not so forcefully as to crowd them out.
After the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve and Treasury tried several
methods to resuscitate market demand for CP. The AMLF, as noted, was successful in the
short term in providing funding for banks to purchase CP from money market funds. But the
volume of the CP market continued to shrink, outstanding CP was increasingly short-term,
and spreads remained elevated. The Federal Reserve created the CPFF LLC, a special purpose
vehicle, to directly purchase relatively long-term (three-month) CP at narrower spreads
from issuers. It was immediately used heavily. The program peaked in January 2009 at
$350 billion of outstanding CP, 20% of total paper outstanding (Logan, Nelson, and
Parkinson 2018). Over the course of 2009, CPFF usage declined as issuers increasingly sold
their paper on the open market.
Similarly, TALF helped restart the ABS market. TALF-eligible ABS issuance accounted for
about two-thirds of total ABS issuance in the second quarter of 2009. As the market
recovered, that percentage fell to just more than one-third in the fourth quarter and a small
fraction by early 2010 (Agarwal et al. 2010).
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Price Discovery
Bank of England economists have said that its targeted purchase program helped reestablish
pricing in the market for corporate bonds, despite its small size. “The presence of a market
maker of last resort quickly restored market functioning and the price floor established by
the purchase programs did not bind for long” (Fawley and Neely 2013).
Many papers conclude that the Federal Reserve’s indirect asset purchase programs helped
improve pricing. Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2011) find that usage of the CPFF was
accompanied by a narrowing of the spread between CP rates and comparable OIS (overnight
indexed swap) rates. Federal Reserve officials noted at an Federal Open Market Committee
meeting in early 2009 that even spreads on CP that was not eligible for purchase under the
CPFF had dropped as investors reentered the market.
Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar (2012) find that TALF contributed to a sharp decline in spreads
in ABS markets by improving liquidity conditions and also had a longer-term impact by
encouraging improvements in the design of CMBS. The authors also argue that TALF helped
permanently shift the composition of the ABS investor base from short-term funds to hedge
funds. Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar (2012) find evidence that TALF reduced the spreads on
legacy CMBS that were accepted into the program. Similarly, the Treasury Office of Financial
Stability (OFS) credits PPIP with having played some role in helping to “restart the market
for [mortgage] securities, thereby allowing banks to begin reducing their holdings in such
assets at more normalized prices” (OFS 2010).
Credit to the Economy
Market participants and government officials have claimed that various market liquidity
programs were successful in channeling credit to frozen markets, although empirical
evidence is limited. Some consider the TALF to be distinctive in offering a more direct impact
to the consumer because nearly all of the auto lenders supported by the TALF reported that
the facility enabled them to offer more credit to consumers at lower rates. Lenders attributed
this impact to the program’s success in re-opening the securitization channel through which
roughly half of consumer loans were financed (Sack 2010).
Announcement Effect
Some programs have been viewed as effective based on the market response to their
announcements. At the time of its announcement, the CBPP was one of the first
unconventional monetary policy actions taken within the Eurosystem and caught market
participants by surprise. A study of TALF finds that nine major announcements over the
course of the program had a substantial effect on market pricing of highly rated auto ABS
and CMBS (Campbell et al. 2011). More specifically, after the announcement of TALF’s
expansion to as much as $1 trillion on February 10, 2009, spreads for the credit card, auto,
and student loan sectors narrowed, according to another study (Agarwal et al. 2010).
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Glossary

ABCP

Asset-backed commercial paper

ABS

Asset-backed securities

AMLF

Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility of the United States was established in September
2008 by the Federal Reserve under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. AMLF lent money to US depository institutions and bank
holding companies to purchase high-quality asset-backed commercial
paper from money market mutual funds. It intended to foster liquidity
in the ABCP market and money markets more generally.

APP

Asset Purchase Program of the United Kingdom was established by
the Bank of England in March 2009. APP primarily purchased gilts and
specifically targeted nonbank financial institutions to improve
liquidity in credit markets that were not functioning normally.

CBPP

Covered Bond Purchase Programs were established by the European
Central Bank in May 2009 and October 2011. CBPP purchased eurodenominated covered bonds issued in the euro area in both primary
and secondary markets to promote the ongoing decline in money
market term rates, to ease funding conditions for credit institutions
and enterprises, to encourage credit institutions to maintain and
expand their lending to clients, and to improve market liquidity in
important segments of the private debt securities market.

CBSMS

Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme of the United Kingdom
was established by the Bank of England in March 2009. CBSMS
purchased modest amounts of a wide range of investment-grade
sterling UK corporate bonds with the aim of improving secondarymarket liquidity, initially by facilitating market-making by banks and
dealers.

CP

Commercial paper

CPF

Commercial Paper Facility of the United Kingdom was established by
the Bank of England in January 2009. CPF purchased commercial
paper from both primary issuers and secondary holders to serve as a
ready buyer for commercial paper, thereby restoring liquidity to
corporate credit markets.

CPFF

Commercial Paper Funding Facility of the United States was
established in October 2008 by the Federal Reserve under Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. CPFF purchased three-month
unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper through an SPV and
intended to enhance liquidity in the commercial paper markets.

MBS

Mortgage-backed securities

MMIFF

Money Market Investor Funding Facility of the United States was
established in October 2008 by the Federal Reserve under section
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13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. MMIFF provided senior secured
funding to a series of LLCs that were established with the private
sector. It intended to provide liquidity to US money market mutual
funds and certain other money market investors, thereby increasing
their ability to meet redemption requests and hence their willingness
to invest in money market instruments, particularly term money
market instruments.
MMF

Money market mutual fund

PDCF

Primary Dealer Credit Facility of the United States was established in
March 2008. PDCF was an overnight loan facility that provided
funding to primary dealers and helped to improve conditions in
financial markets more generally.

PPIP

Public-Private Investment Program of the United States was
established in March 2009 by the Treasury, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve under the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP). Using TARP capital and capital from
private investors, PPIP generated purchasing power to buy legacy
assets. It was to support market functioning and facilitate price
discovery in the markets for legacy commercial mortgage-backed
securities and nonagency residential mortgage-backed securities.

SCPF

Secured Commercial Paper Facility of the United Kingdom was
established in July 2009 by the Bank of England. SCPF purchased
secured commercial paper from eligible parties in the primary and
secondary markets to improve the function of markets for the raising
of short-term working capital.

SMP

Securities Market Program was established by the European Central
Bank in May 2010. SMP purchased government bonds of selected
countries from the secondary market to aid malfunctioning securities
markets, restore liquidity, and enable proper functioning of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.

TALF

Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility of the United States was
established in November 2008 by the Federal Reserve under Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. TALF issued loans with terms of up
to five years to holders of eligible asset-backed securities and
facilitated the issuance of ABS collateralized by a variety of consumer
and business loans, intending to improve the market conditions for
ABS more generally.

Three-Year LTRO

Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations was established by
the European Central Bank in December 2011. It used its regular
LTRO format but extended the term to three years to provide liquidity
to European financial institutions to lend on private wholesale
funding markets during a period of persistent and growing market
tension.

TSLF

Term Securities Lending Facility of the United States was established
in March 2008 under Section 13(3) and 14 of the Federal Reserve Act.
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TSLF loaned Treasury securities to primary dealers for one month
against eligible collateral.
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